ACLU Memo to Interested Persons Regarding Myths About Patriot Act Surveillance from the Administration (12/2/2005)
To:
Interested Persons
From:
Timothy H. Edgar, National Security Policy Counsel[1]
Re: More Myths about
Patriot Act Surveillance from the
Administration
In a lengthy letter to House Judiciary Chairman F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-WI), dated November 23, 2005 (“DOJ Letter”), Assistant
Attorney General William Moschella charges that a Washington Post article
presents a “materially misleading portrayal” of the FBI’s use of national
security letters.[2] In fact, the article is accurate and the
letter does not identify any actual errors. Instead, despite much rhetoric, it
confirms the substantive points made by the article about this troubling
power.
The standard – relevance to a national security
investigation, the scope of which is determined by the government – was
accurately stated by the Washington Post story, and this standard does permit
the government to obtain the records of ordinary, law abiding Americans. The DOJ Letter acknowledges this when it
states that “some people whose records are produced in response to an NSL may
not be terrorists or spies or associated with terrorists or spies,” but that the
“the FBI needs to be able to check out every tip and track down every
lead.”
- NSLs are issued by FBI
officials alone, with no review by a court or the Justice Department, before or
after the fact.
The DOJ Letter points out that the opening of an
investigation requires DOJ approval, and that the FBI’s intelligence activities
(including its use of NSLs) are subject to oversight by DOJ’s Inspector General
and Congress. This is not the same
thing as a review of the issuance of NSLs.
Whether a national security letter is issued is in the sole
discretion of the FBI. The DOJ
Letter also ignores the serious shortcomings of IG oversight as a tool to
prevent abuses. The IG relies on
complaints by members of the public -- people who do not even know whether their records
are being scrutinized. The DOJ
Letter also does not dispute that Congress has been provided with nothing other
than a partial count of NSLs, and that its requests for more detailed
information (including reports required by law) have produced responses that are
late, incomplete or nonexistent.
- Information from NSLs
– including records of innocent Americans – can be widely shared.
The letter makes clear that, as a result of
information-sharing mandates regarding “terrorism information,” state, local and
tribal governments, as well as private sector entities, are supposed to receive
“terrorism information.” It cites absolutely no legal impediment or safeguard
for the sharing of information about non-targets, obtained with an NSL, pursuant
to those mandates.
- NSLs can be used to
obtain library records, and it now public knowledge that the FBI has sought
records from a member of the American Library Association.
The DOJ Letter makes clear that the DOJ is using an NSL to
obtain “subscriber information, billing information, and access logs” about
library patrons. The DOJ Letter
asserts the NSL does not seek library checkout records, but provides no facts to
refute the software vendor’s legitimate concern that library check-out
information, and the names of websites visited by library patrons, is difficult
or impossible to segregate from the information the NSL does seek.
- NSLs are very
different from grand jury subpoenas.
The DOJ Letter tries to downplay the very real differences
between NSLs and grand jury subpoenas.
However, it actually confirms the basic differences – 1) that NSLs are
issued in wide-ranging “national security” investigations that can and do
investigate lawful activities, while grand jury subpoenas are limited to
investigations of crime, and 2) that NSLs are always permanently secret, while
grand jury subpoenas rarely are secret.
The non-disclosure obligation applies with respect to every NSL, whether
or not there is actually any need for secrecy in the particular case, and the
obligation is imposed without the involvement of a court. Moreover, the non-disclosure obligation
is permanent; it persists long after any legitimate need for secrecy has
expired. The DOJ Letter does not
contest any of this.
- The ability to
challenge an NSL is unclear, and one federal district court has found that, in
practice, the letters are so coercive that judicial review is effectively
unavailable for most recipients.
The DOJ Letter mischaracterizes the fundamental debate,
currently at issue in litigation, over the right to challenge an NSL. While the government’s position is that
there is a right to consult an attorney and challenge an NSL, there is no such
right expressly granted by the statute.
The DOJ Letter states that the NSL statute permits an NSL recipient to
make disclosures to agents, including attorneys. This contention simply ignores the plain
language of the statute. The
statute says that NSL recipients are prohibited from disclosing even the
existence of the NSL to “any person.”
The statue contains no language exempting disclosures to ”agents.” One
federal court has said that, in practice, the letters are so coercive that a
recipient is effectively foreclosed from asserting such a challenge. That case is currently on appeal. The DOJ Letter treats this unsettled
issue as if it had already been definitely settled.
Endnote
[2] Barton Gellman,
The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Examines Records of
Ordinary Americans, Washington Post, November 6, 2005, at p. A1.
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